with no authority to enact § 13981 of VAWA primarily because the amendment reaches only actions committed by state officials, not the actions of private individuals who commit violence against women. 4 The requirement of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state action doctrine, has been subjected to significant scholarly criticism. Some academics argue that certain kinds of private action should fall within the rubric of state action for purposes of the doctrine. 5 Others have argued that the state action requirement should be abolished altogether. 6 Regardless of how persuasive one finds those arguments, one need not adopt either of them in order to find § 13981 in VAWA constitutional.
To understand the constitutionality of § 13981 in VAWA, one needs to examine the scope of the constitutional violation at issue when states
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 ("[A]ction
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.") (citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 n.12 (1948)).
5. See, e.g., Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 Mo. L. REv. 499, 512 (1994) (suggesting that Fourteenth Amendment should be read in conjunction with Privileges and Immunities Clause as creating state duty to intervene between private parties to protect fundamental interests). Although the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit language restricts the state from abridging these rights, Congress intended the amendment to protect against private encroachment by opening federal courts to actions directly against private parties that violated the rights of individuals. See id. at 547 (stating primary purpose of amendment was to legitimate Civil Rights Act of 1866 which defined some fundamental rights). Congress may create a private cause of action between private parties when, because the state is unwilling to protect the interest, the Supreme Court's review of state actions would provide inadequate protection. See id. (quoting and refuting dicta that states amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful") (citation omitted); see also RobertJ. Glennon,Jr. &John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 231 (suggesting balancing test to weigh competing rights in context of Fourteenth Amendment protection). If an alleged deprivation violates the amendment and the deprivation occurs because the state maintains a legal system which legitimates or tolerates the deprivation, the state can be said to have chosen the practice that creates the deprivation as a superior right. See id. at 230 (noting method of state to deprive person of right to due process). Confronted with this conflict, the court must determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment dictates a preference for one right over the other, i.e., the right to engage in the practice that causes the deprivation over the right to be free from the deprivation. See id. at 221 (explaining appropriate inquiry); see also Charles L. Black,Jr., "State Action, "Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 (1967) (criticizing Supreme Court's formulation of state action doctrine).
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 505 (1985) ("I suggest that it is time to begin rethinking state action. It is time to again ask why infringements of the most basic values-speech, privacy, and equalityshould be tolerated just because the violator is a private entity rather than the government."). address violence against women. Imagine an average rape victim. She is drinking with friends at a party when an acquaintance gets her alone and becomes sexually aggressive. 7 She begins to cry. Despite her tears and repeated no's, he pins her down and rapes her. Like most rape victims, she suffers little injury extrinsic to the rape itself. 8 She has no bruises or other corroborative evidence, but she wants to die inside. If she calls the police, officials may disbelieve her and code the case as "unfounded" (a false complaint).9 Or police may bury her complaint by logging it with a non-criminal code, where it will receive little to no investigation.' 0 Police also may encourage her to withdraw the complaint. If police do choose to investigate and arrest her attacker, prosecutors nevertheless may choose not to indict him because the victim failed to complain promptly enough, failed to resist her attacker forcefully enough or failed to lead her prior sexual life virtuously enough. 11 These discretionary decisions by state actors have their roots in earlier statutes and the common law when corroboration, fresh complaint, utmost resistance and chastity on the part of the victim were more formally required. If our hypothetical acquaintance rape victim manages to make it to the trial stage of the process, she will be subjected to cross examination that includes a detailed scrutiny of her prior sexual history with the assailant offered to prove that she consented and is now lying. Therefore, if this victim reports having been raped to the police, she will be subjected to a humiliating process-the laws and legal procedures that constitute what some scholars have called the "second rape."
12 Ordinarily, she also will receive no legal redress for the wrong against her.1 3 On the other hand, if the victim does not report having been raped to the police, she will receive rio legal redress, but she will manage to avoid the penalties that often befall those who do report. It is not surprising, therefore, that most victims do not report having been raped to the police. 7 . For a discussion of the prevalence of acquaintance rape, see infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the non-physical harm caused by rape, see infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of "unfounding," see infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of police discretion, see infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion, see infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
12. See LEE MADIGAN & NANCY GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTIN-UED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM (1991) (discussing theory of "second rape"); see also MARTIN S. GREENBERG & R. BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAUNG 7 (1992) (describing "second injury" phenomenon). Unsympathetic justice officials and defense attorneys can exacerbate the stress and discomfort caused by the initial victimization. See id. (discussing problems for victims reporting cases).
13. For a discussion of rape victims' lack of legal redress, see infra notes 147-70 and accompanying text. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 15 Women's rights under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated by states' unwillingness to provide women with equal legal protection against violence that is motivated by gender animus. Section 1 affords women the right to be free from this kind of gender discrimination. 16 In response to states' pervasive and systematic denial of equal protection, women have little to no faith in the formal structures of police power to remedy violence motivated by gender animus. As a result, the vast majority of women do not report to police when they are raped or battered. 17 Thus, the reality of state action extends beyond whether state actors respond poorly to any individual woman who alleges having been beaten or raped. States in fact deter women from turning to their authority because the protection they offer is unequal and often illusory.
The fact that state laws and procedures deter victims from reporting has consequences for what remedies Congress is authorized to enact under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to enforce women's equal protection rights in this context. Because the states' denial of equal protection inhibits women from reporting, reporting itself cannot be a condition precedent to obtaining relief under section 5. When states' laws and procedures deter women from reporting the violence they suffer, states have acted to deny equal protection. Nevertheless, when a woman does not report, there is no state actor she can sue for the equal protection violation.1 8 Congress should therefore be authorized under section 5
to remedy the violation of her equal protection rights by providing her with the opportunity to make a civil claim against the individual who committed the crime motivated by gender animus. Only if section 5 autho-14. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of" article I. Id. 16. For a discussion of the section 1 violation, see infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
17. Women who are battered likewise do not ordinarily report their violence to the state. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 889 (1992) (noting district court's finding that secrecy typically shrouds abusive families and that victims do not report abuse). "Researchers estimate that one in every two women will be battered at some time in their life." Id. at 888.
18. Even if she could sue a state actor, it would be very difficult for her to obtain relief under the relevant doctrines of § 1983.
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The argument here does not rely on a notion that the state is encouraging violence against women, although one could argue that states do encourage it because they fail to prosecute it vigorously. The argument does not depend on the notion that there is a symbiotic relationship between the private violence at issue here and state action, although one could argue that there is in the case of violence against women. This argument assumes nothing new about how courts should measure a violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to violence against women. Congress found that states deny women equal protection of the law through state laws and the discretionary decisions and practices of state actors, such as police, prosecutors and judges.'
9 What is new here is an understanding of what section 5 authorizes once states' violations of section 1 deter women from engaging the state altogether. Because rational actors do not choose to report to the state when to do so would be futile, Congress is not limited under section 5 to remedying only those cases in which women do report to the state. Rather, Congress has the authority under section 5 to attack the real problem-the pervasive denial of a legal remedy for women who suffer crimes motivated by gender animus. When states' violations of section 1 deter women from reporting, Congress may provide a legal remedy in the form of civil claims against private actors. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the "power to enforce by appropriate legislation," section l's commitment to equal protection. 20 Section 13981 in VAWA is the most appropriate legislation to enforce the provisions of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in this context. Part II of this Article describes the Morrison facts and the Supreme Court's analysis of the section 1 violation.
2 1 Part III reviews the full scope of the section 1 violation, both historically and currently. 22 It argues that, historically, explicit requirements in rape law evinced profound gender bias and that, although those requirements have been formally abolished in the past few decades, they continue to direct the discretionary decisions of state actors. Specifically, as a result of the biased imperatives behind the historical requirements in rape law, police disproportionately "unfound" rape complaints, place the complaints in non-criminal codes and discourage women from proceeding with their complaints. Additionally, prosecutors disproportionately dismiss rape cases because of the same bi- She said "no." Morrison asked again, and again she said "no." '26 Brzonkala tried to leave the room, but "Morrison grabbed her, and threw her, face-up, on a bed . . . he pushed her down by the shoulders and disrobed her."
27 Brzonkala struggled to get free, but Morrison pinned her with his arms and legs and forcibly raped her. 28 Before she could escape, Crawford then entered the room, pinned Brzonkala with his arms and legs and forcibly raped her. After Crawford had finished, Morrison then raped Brzonkala a second time. Morrison warned Brzonkala after these three rapes that she "better not have any fucking diseases." 29 In the following months, Morrison boasted in the dorm dining hall that he "like [d] 41. See id. The school officials informed Brzonkala that "there might be merit to Morrison's 'ex post facto' challenge that he was charged under a Sexual Assault Policy that was not yet spelled out in the Student Handbook." Id. The officials also told Brzonkala that the school would hold a second hearing, under the school's previous Abusive Conduct Policy, because "Virginia Tech was unwilling to defend the school's decision to suspend Morrison for a year in court." Id. Brzonkala was told that the second hearing was "a mere technicality" because the officials "believed [Brzonkala's] story." Id. The second hearing turned out to be much more that this re-hearing was, a "mere technicality. ' 42 In preparation for the second hearing, Virginia Tech officials gave the recordings and transcripts of the first hearing to Morrison's attorney, but withheld them from Brzonkala's attorney. 43 After the second hearing, the Committee found Morrison guilty of "using abusive language," not sexual assault, and it re-imposed a suspension. 44 Morrison again appealed the suspension. 4 5 The Vice-President of Virginia Tech then withdrew the punishment imposed, finding that it was "excessive when compared with other cases where there has been a finding of a violation" of the student code of conduct. 46 The Vice-President required, instead, that Morrison attend a one-hour educational session on Virginia Tech's student policies. 47 There was no letter from Virginia Tech officials this time informing Brzonkala of Virginia Tech's decision to set than a "mere technicality;" it lasted more than twice as long as the first hearing and required Brzonkala to provide and pay for her own attorney. BULL., Feb. 9, 1998, at 6 (noting Dean's conversation with Brzonkala concerning second hearing).
43. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d. at 955 (elaborating on Virginia Tech's cooperation with Morrison in preparation for second hearing). School officials informed Morrison, with ample notice, that testimony from the first hearing would not be admitted, that live witnesses or sworn affidavits were required at the second hearing and provided him with "complete and early access" to the tape recordings of the first hearing. See id. (highlighting school's assistance to Morrison in preparation for second hearing). In contrast, Virginia Tech "belatedly" informed Brzonkala that the testimony from the first hearing would be inadmissible. See id. at 954-55 (indicating school's lack of assistance to Brzonkala in preparation for second hearing). Because the second hearing took place during the summer, Brzonkala did not have time to locate her witnesses or to produce sworn affidavits from them. See id. at 955. Virginia Tech officials also prevented Brzonkala from recounting her entire version of the assault; the school required her to leave out any mention of Crawford because the charges against him had been dismissed in the first hearing. See id. ("[A]s a result she had to present a truncated and unnatural version of the facts.").
44. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 603 (2000) ("This time, however, the description of Morrison's offense was, without explanation, changed from 'sexual assault' to 'using abusive language.'"). Neither Brzonkala nor her attorney knew of the reduction in charges against Morrison. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955-56 (discussing reduction of charges). Brzonkala learned of the "abusive language" charge through a newspaper article. See id.
45. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955 ("He argued due process violation, the existence of new information, and the asserted harshness and arbitrariness of the sanction imposed on him as grounds for reversal of the judicial committee's decision.").
46. 60. There is a significant argument to be made that civil rights legislation should come under the rubric of the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Commerce Clause. As Professor Jack Balkin has argued, "The Fourteenth Amendment is the natural home of civil rights legislation. It guarantees equal citizenship, and it gives Congress power to enforce equality rights." Jack M. Balkin, The Court Defers to a Racist Era, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at A23.
Justice Douglas had stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was a preferable source of congressional authority for the major civil rights legislation of the 1960s. See Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas,J., concurring) (stating that "the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against them because of race. . . 'occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines"'). Douglas argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "much more obvious as a protective measure under the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Commerce Clause" because the "former deals with the constitutional status of the individual not with the impact on commerce of local activities or vice versa." Id. Justice Douglas stated emphatically: "our decision should be based on the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby putting an end to all obstructionist strategies and allowing every person-whatever his race, creed, or color-to patronize all places of public accommodation without discrimination whether he travels interstate or intrastate." Id. at 286. Justice Goldberg agreed, noting that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "the vindication of human dignity and not mere economics." Id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court noted that a "voluminous congressional record" supported the conclusion that "there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence."
65 The Court then briefly described the congressional findings:
Congress received evidence that many participants in state justice systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions. Congress concluded that these discriminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably le- nient punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence.
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The Court then moved from the section 1 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the issue of congressional authority to remedy the unequal protection under section 5. Before turning to the details of the Court's section 5 analysis, however, it is important to step back and examine the section 1 violation because its scope has implications for congressional power to fashion appropriate remedial legislation under section 5.
UNEQUAL PROTECTION
Violence against women that is motivated by gender animus includes instances of stalking, battery, assault, rape and homicide. In analyzing how states afford women unequal protection against this kind of violence, I will focus on the social and legal practices surrounding rape because the Morrison case is about rape. Despite my focus, much of what I argue regarding states' unequal protection against rape can also be said of other crimes that are similarly motivated by gender animus. Similar analyses could be made of wife abuse and murder, for example, if one examined the marital tort immunity doctrine 67 and the gendered notions of provocation 68 and self-defense in the law of homicide. 70. See MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 143 (describing societal and legal reality informing Congress' decision to enact VAWA). Evidence substantiating the failure of state justice systems to provide women with equal protection from domestic violence and sexual assault was significant:
One in four women in America reports having been raped, with fortyfour percent reporting having been subjected to completed or attempted rape at least once in their lives. Almost one in ten women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four who has had sexual intercourse reports that her first act of sexual intercourse was "not voluntary. 72 The study concludes, "given the pervasiveness of rape and physical assault among American women, it is imperative that violence against women be treated as a major criminal justice and public health concern." 7 3
Brzonkala was raped by acquaintances. Like Morrison and Crawford, the vast majority of rapists are not complete strangers to their victims. Friends and acquaintances commit fifty-three percent of all rapes and sexual assaults.
7 " Intimates-that is, husbands, boyfriends, former husbands and former boyfriends-commit an additional twenty-six percent of all rapes and sexual assaults. 75 In total, acquaintances and intimates commit four out of five rapes and sexual assaults. Morrison and Crawford did not break Brzonkala's bones, beat her up or threaten her with a gun or knife. They did not have to. Pinning her with their arms and legs was sufficient to force her to have sex against her will. Like Brzonkala, the vast majority of rape victims suffer little or no physical injury extrinsic to the rape itself. Only about ten percent of rape victims suffer extrinsic physical injury.
7 7 The major injury most rape victims suffer is psychological.
After being raped, Brzonkala dropped out of school, suffered from depression and attempted suicide. Like Brzonkala, the vast majority of rape victims suffer serious psychological harm from the experience. 78 Contrary to popular opinion, acquaintance rape victims suffer more psychological damage than do stranger rape victims because self-blame is higher when a woman is raped by an acquaintance. 79 As one study put it, 455, 458 (1996) (explaining that coping through self-blame impedes recovery).
Self-blame has severe psychological and somatic consequences. Self-blame decreases the chance that a woman victimized by rape or attempted rape will tell 82 This negative symptomalogy can have dire consequences: "The more women blamed themselves for the rape, the more suicidal they had been since the rape, the greater the likelihood that they had been psychiatrically hospitalized, and the lower their self-esteem." 83 In total, nearly one-third of rape victims develop posttraumatic stress disorder, and thirteen percent of rape victims attempt suicide.
8 4 Brzonkala's depression and attempted suicide, then, were not unique.
The institutional response to Brzonkala's complaint also was not unique. Brzonkala received no legal or quasi-legal vindication against her rapists. She lodged a complaint under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. Two university hearings ended with no conviction for Crawford and a conviction of "using abusive language" for Morrison. The punishment imposed on Morrison was a one-hour educational session. 85 Like Brzonkala, someone about the attack, report the rape to the police or obtain necessary psy- 83. See Katz & Burt, supra note 79, at 151, 162-63 ("The more women felt that they had blamed themselves for the rape, the higher their current levels of psychological distress as measured by negative symptomalogy ....
Higher levels of selfblame were also associated with more hours of counseling since the rape... and with the length of time women felt it took (or would take) for them to be 'recovered."') (statistics omitted). the vast majority of rape victims never get to witness their rapists convicted of any serious crime or sentenced to serious punishment., 6 States historically have denied women equal protection of the law in response to rape, and continue to do so. Traditional common law rules for rape complaints evinced obvious gender bias. Over the past few decades, these rules have changed, but the biased imperatives behind them continue to direct the discretionary decisions of state actors. First, police disproportionately code rapes as "unfounded" or place them in non-criminal codes where they receive little to no investigation. 8 7 Also, police disproportionately discourage women who have been raped from proceeding with their complaints. 88 Furthermore, prosecutors disproportionately dismiss rape complaints.
See NAT'L VICTIM CTR., RAPE-RELATED POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS
8 9 A state action analysis of violence against women must comprehend not just the formal law but the discretionary decisions of state actors. Through these decisions, state actors deny women who are raped the equal protection of the criminal law.
A. Formal Rape Law Has Historically Been Unequal
Historically, rape law raised unique procedural hurdles for rape victims that victims of other crimes did not have to surmount. Derived from English common law and applicable in most jurisdictions until the mid to late 1970s, these formal rules embodied clear presumptions against women who complained of having been raped. 9° These rules included absolute exemptions from criminal liability for men who raped their wives. They included requirements that the victim establish that she resisted her attacker to the utmost, freshly complained of having been raped and corroborated her testimony with other evidence. 9 2 They included biased suppositions about victims who had previously engaged in sexual intercourse outside of marriage. 93 Finally, they included special cautionary instruc- When scholars examine the biased presumptions against women embodied in the English common law of rape, many focus on the marital rape exemption. The marital rape exemption denied married women the protection of criminal rape law, simply by virtue of the fact that they were married. 95 It provided that a man could not be guilty of rape for anything he did to his wife because, as the Model Penal Code still puts it by definition, rape involves "a male who has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife." 9 6 Since the 1970s, most states have eroded or abolished entirely the common law marital rape exemption.
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The marital rape exemption is the most obvious gender bias in the common law of rape. Other requirements that historically had to be met before a rape conviction could be obtained were also biased. For example, the historical requirement that a rape victim resist her attacker to the utmost to prove non-consent was unique in the criminal law.
9 8 Many other crimes have had a consent defense, but none has defined consent in such a way that "no" would not suffice to disprove it. 99 The resistance requirement mandated that a woman physically resist her attacker to the utmost to prove both that she did not consent and that he had to use force to subdue her.1 00 The resistance requirement has evolved over the course of the last few decades from an utmost resistance requirement to a reasonable resistance requirement in many jurisdictions to the more common situation today, where no formal resistance requirement remains in many rape statutes.' 0 Historically, in a significant minority ofjurisdictions, corroboration of the victim's complaint with other evidence also was a requirement before a 94. For a discussion of these cautionary instructions, see infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. Additionally, the law historically insisted that rape victims be sexually virtuous in order to receive vindication for the sexual transgressions against them. In Biblical times, the crime of rape was limited to the rape of virgins.
1 0 5 The rape of a virgin was not conceptualized as a transgression against a female's sexual autonomy; rather, it was the theft of her chastity, which was a property transgression against her father or future husband. Although a formal virginity requirement waned as English law recognized that women and girls who were not virgins could also be raped, the victim's sexual chastity remained predominant in courts' evaluation of the crime.', 6 The rape of a non-virgin, for example, was not as serious a crime as was the rape of a virgin and was not punished as severely. Even when statutes in both England and the United States made no formal distinctions between virgins and non-virgins, the centrality of the victim's chastity endured. A victim's lack of sexual chastity was considered relevant evidence on the issue of both consent and the victim's credibility as a witness, that is, her propensity to tell the truth. 1 7 A lack of chastity on the part of the victim suggested both that she had a propensity to consent to sexual intercourse and that she had a propensity to lie.
Historically, the common law of rape also required a prompt complaint before a rape case could be prosecuted. This special rule evolved from the doctrine of "hue and cry," which was a legal expectation that 102. See ESTRICH, supra note 90, at 43 (noting that corroboration of rape victim's testimony to support conviction continues to be critical factor in disposition of rape cases today).
103. See id. at 44 (explaining that "[t]he plausibility of the victim's story was determinative").
104. See id. at 42-45 (describing corroboration differences). 105. See Deuteronomy 22:23-27 (reciting distinction). The text of Deuteronomy makes a distinction between the rape of a betrothed virgin and the rape of an unbetrothed virgin. If a man found a betrothed virgin and "the man force her and lie with her" and she cried out against the violation, he was to be punished by being stoned to death. See id. However, "if a man finds a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her and lie with her," he had to marry her "because he hath humbled her" and he had to pay her father fifty shekels of silver, which was the bride price. Deuteronomy 22:28-29. The bride price compensated the father for the loss of his daughter's virginity. The only "punishment" for the rape of an un-betrothed virgin (besides paying the usual bride price) was that the man "may not put her away all his days," meaning that he could never divorce her. Deuteronomy 22:29. The punishment of seduction of a "maid that is not betrothed" is also marriage and paying money to the father. Since the nineteenth century, special cautionary instructions to juries in rape cases provide the final example of the common law's distrust of women who complained of being raped.
1 2 These instructions directed the jury to evaluate the testimony of a woman who complained of being raped with extra caution. In their usual prescription, the jury was directed to "evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private." ' 1 3 These instructions implied that women are untrustworthy as witnesses and that the jury should not convict a defendant on the basis of their testimony alone.
Most of these biased requirements in rape law-the marital rape exemption, the requirements of resistance, sexual virtue, corroboration, prompt complaint and cautionary instructions regarding a rape complainant's testimony-have been modified or abolished in the law. It may be easy, therefore, to dismiss them as historical wrongs. Such a dismissal would be unwise. Today, the biased traditional requirements are operational in law through more informal channels. They direct the discretionary decisions of police and prosecutors.
B. Police Discretion Over Rape Complaints Is Exercised Unequally
The criminal justice system is built upon the discretionary decisions of state actors who process criminal complaints. the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict economy dictate that officials process only select cases. Consequently, a broad area of discretion enables officials to decide which suspects to prosecute and on what charges. Normative values and personal bias inform police and prosecutorial judgments regarding relevant evidence, appropriate procedure and, ultimately, the merits of the complaint. Thus, access to justice for rape victims is often governed not so much by statute but by police and prosecutorial discretion.
The selection process begins when police decide whether a report is valid, whether a reported offense is a crime, whether to investigate the reported crime and whether to arrest a suspect.'
15 Within the context of those discretionary decisions, women have been and continue to be denied equal protection of the law when subjected to criminal violence motivated by gender. The denial of equal protection occurs because police exercise their discretion when dealing with rape complaints in an unfair and unequal manner. This unequal treatment is evidenced by two institutionalized police practices that undermine the process by which rape victims seek protection and justice. First, police disproportionately categorize rape complaints as "unfounded" or log them under non-criminal codes. Second, police disproportionately discourage rape victims from proceeding with their complaints.
Unequal Categorization of Rape Complaints
Police deny equal protection to rape victims by disproportionately mis-categorizing legitimate rape complaints in two ways. First, police can decide that the victim is fabricating the complaint and deem the complaint "unfounded."
116 Second, police can decide that what happened to the complainant did not constitute a crime and assign the complaint a non-criminal code. 17 In both instances, police terminate their official obligation to investigate rape allegations further and often deny legitimate victims full redress through the criminal law.' 18 At this early stage of investigation, police disproportionately categorize rape allegations in a manner that denies the occurrence of any criminal wrongdoing.
1 19 For procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under the law." Id. The labels differ among police departments across the country, but the process is similar. By unfounding and downgrading crimes involving violence against women, police departments neglect to investigate hundreds, perhaps thousands, of legitimate rape complaints every year. '
See
22 As a result, rape complaints fall into statistical blackholes, cities underreport their rape rates and police departments deny women equal protection and justice. For example, in the past decade, the Philadelphia Police Department decided that a fairly large percentage of reported sexual assaults were unworthy of further investigation.' 23 During that time, the rate for "unfounded" rape complaints reached eighteen percent, and the rate for 121. See Fazlollah, Philadelphia's Hidden Rapes, supra note 116 (highlighting propensity to unfound and underreport rape rates in other metropolitan areas). "The practices we found in Philadelphia appear in cities large and small." Id. The Phoenix rape squad shelves difficult rape cases with a code called "information only report." See id. (noting rape case procedure of Phoenix rape squad). According to a former Phoenix sex crimes supervisor, approximately one third of the city's sexual assault complaints were classified as "information only." See id. (same). Milwaukee has repeatedly reported more than forty percent of rape complaints were "unfounded." See id. (discussing Milwaukee rape squad procedure).
122. See id. (noting effects of police's unfounding and downgrading of crimes). After Philadelphia Inquirer reporter Mark Fazlollah put a spotlight on the habitual unfounding of rape allegations by the Philadelphia rape squad, the city police department reopened the 2,000 cases buried by code "2701" during the past five years. See id. (noting reaction of police department after press initiated scrutiny). To date, police have already made forty-six arrests from cases dating to 1995. See id.
See id. (discussing decisions of Philadelphia police with respect to sexual assaults).
assigning non-criminal codes to sexual assault complaints reached thirty percent. 124 Other cities have experienced similar problems. In 1989, for instance, the Oakland Police Department coded twenty-five percent of reported rapes as "unfounded."
12 5 More common than even this high "unfounded" rate, cases would be left in pending files on police officers' desks without proper investigation.
12 6 Mark Melton, a deputy district attorney in Oakland, explained that so many complaints were ignored because "[police] tend to see a black woman smoking crack as a woman who is willing to give herself up for dope. 
Unequal Pressure on Victims to Withdraw Rape Complaints
Police also deny women equal protection of the law by disproportionately pressuring those who report being raped to withdraw their complaints. One major study indicates that a victim's decision to report having been raped to the police is influenced by social expectations about whether or not to report.
13 7 Social expectations, including those of the police, also influence a victim's decision to withdraw her complaint.
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The victim's decision to withdraw a complaint after it is lodged with the police "is more complex than simply a statement of victim volition."' 1 3 9
The police detective's "perceptions of the likely success of prosecution" of a victim's claim bear on the victim's decision to proceed. 141. See id. at 309 (noting that police use complainant's apprehension as leverage against complainant). The study concluded that a scientific analysis of "complainant willingness to prosecute may, in fact, be disclosing the circumstances under which detectives tend to be inclined or disinclined to pursue a complaint." Id.
Another study that analyzed police influence revealed that a victim's willingness to prosecute her claim after she has reported the rape to the police "[represents] a major point of [police] discretion, partly because the decision is superficially not an official decision."' 42 As the study explained, "the detective does not have to create the elements by which to manipulate the victim's decision; all that is required is a selective presentation of the reality . . .that confronts her."
143 For example, police may persuade a victim to withdraw the complaint by emphasizing the wellknown obstacles that she will face if she does proceed, including a grueling cross-examination by the defense attorney and the limited likelihood of success at trial. The complicated set of reasons considered by a victim when choosing whether to proceed "provides the detective the possibility for manipulation." 144 The study concluded, "[tlhese interacting dimensions, namely low visibility, credible risks for the citizen, situational ambiguity, low credibility of potential complainant, and self-interest of an official, provide a model for the appearance and dynamics of the abuse of discretion in official decision-making."'
45

C. Prosecutorial Discretion Over Rape Complaints Is Exercised Unequally
Independent of the work of police, prosecutors also deny women equal protection of the law by dismissing rape cases disproportionately. If a rape victim reports having been raped to the police, and if police found the complaint and make an arrest, then police turn the case over to the district attorney's office for prosecution. At that point, prosecutors act as "gatekeepers" in deciding which of these rape cases will be prosecuted. 1 46 Unfortunately, prosecutors keep a disproportionate number of rape victims waiting at the gate. The SenateJudiciary Committee found that prosecutors are twice as likely to dismiss a rape case as to dismiss a murder case, and about forty percent more likely to dismiss a rape case than to dismiss a robbery case.1
47
Of those rape cases police deliver to the district attorney's office for prosecution that fail to result in a conviction, eighty-nine percent are the result of prosecutorial dismissals. 148 actually arrested, few are vigorously prosecuted." 149 She contended, the most "dangerous" aspect of the nearly unfettered prosecutorial discretion to cherry-pick cases for trial is that this discretion,"is exercised in the dark, often by minimally trained law graduates, with few systems in place to protect against bias or stupidity."' 5 0 Why then do prosecutors reject so many cases? "Prejudice is one answer," Vachss said.' 5 1 "Many victims fail to meet (undisclosed, unacknowledged and always denied) law enforcement standards for behavior, background or ethnicity." 15 2
Research corroborates Vachss' contention. One seventeen-month study in 1991 of two district attorneys' offices in different cities involved the observation of more than 300 case screenings where district attorneys decided whether cases were accepted or rejected for prosecution. The study revealed that discretion was often exercised against women who were homeless, prostituted, addicted or involved in other criminal activity.
153
The study also revealed that "prosecutors rely on assumptions about relationships, gender, and sexuality" in deciding whether to seek an indictment in rape cases, 154 and that the negative implications of this policy
were "particularly acute for acquaintance rape" victims.'
55
Prosecutors discredited victims' allegations of sexual assault to justify rejecting cases.
15 6 Prosecutors compared the facts of cases to what they believed would be the facts of "typical" rapes, and used such comparisons to reject many complaints for prosecution. For example, one district attorney justified his rejection of an extended kidnapping in which the victim was raped vaginally because, "my experience has been that when a rapist has a victim cornered for a long time, they engage in multiple acts and different types of sexual acts." 1 5 7 Another district attorney justified his rejection of an assault that included three anal rapes because, "[i]t seems to me he should be doing more than [anal rape] by the third time," 1 5 8
The traditional common law requirements of rape also came into play more during this process of rejecting claims for prosecution. The study recounted one district attorney who rejected a complaint because the victim failed to report promptly. has been raped."
159 District attorneys rejected other cases for lack of corroboration; one district attorney declared that she would never "file a oneon-one case," which is a case without corroborative evidence beyond the testimony of the victim herself. 160 Therefore, this study found that prosecutors exercised their discretion to dismiss rape complaints for failure to report promptly, lack of corroboration and victim deviation from the norms of appropriate female behavior. The historical impediments written into rape law are thus related to today's disproportionate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Alice Vachss put it this way: " [d] espite the advent of improved legislation, the underprosecution of sex crimes continues: no longer tactically impossible, underprosecution has become a law enforcement choice." 16 1 A study of the Uniform Crime Reports and National Crime Victimization Surveys from 1973 to 1990 provides some statistical support for Vachss' position. The study revealed that statutory rape law reforms have "not had a very substantial effect" on "actual practices in the criminal justice system." 1 6 2 Despite rape law reforms, for example, there continued to be a large "discount" for those who rape acquaintances. 163 The study noted, "[a] lthough attitudes about rape and rape victimization may have become more enlightened in the past two decades, there is little evidence to suggest that these attitudes have been translated into significant performance changes in the criminal justice system." 164 Selective prosecution of gender-motivated crimes also does not stop with police and prosecutor selectivity. Judges also exercise discretion, and can trivialize women's complaints of abuse and impose de minimis sentences on men who abuse their partners. 165 Despite the significant statutory reforms over the past few decades, not much has changed for many women who report having been raped to the police.1 66 The biased common law requirements of rape continue to infect the process.
Police do not treat crimes against women equally to how they treat other crimes. Rape is not taken as seriously and rape victims are dispro- portionately discouraged from utilizing state resources to vindicate their rights. State indifference, failure to provide adequate law enforcement resources and the lack of will to enforce rape laws encourage rape to proceed unhindered. This is the state action that denies women the equal protection of the laws.
After four years of hearings on the matter beginning in 1990, Congress made findings regarding women and criminal law enforcement. In a series of congressional hearings, attorneys, victim advocates, health care practitioners, judges, victims themselves and others testified to a chronic problem of under-enforcement of the criminal law in areas affecting women. 167 Congress heard extensive testimony that women who had been sexually victimized were considered at fault, unharmed or not credible. Based on these hearings, Congress determined that state laws and criminal justice systems, deeply infected with gender bias, had failed to investigate, prosecute or otherwise remedy many crimes of rape and other forms of violence against women. 169 Congress concluded that the "overwhelming enforcement failure fuels gender-based violence and allows it to continue unchecked." 1 70
D. Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer
States are such chronic bad actors in the area of violence against women that most women who suffer rape have no faith that the state will take their claims of victimization seriously. As a result, the vast majority of women do not report to state authorities when they suffer sexual violence. 
Id.
171. According to Catherine MacKinnon, the justice system's failure is a product of both the content and the administration of present laws. See MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 142-43 (criticizing rape law and police administration of rape law). For example, because most rape victims share a degree of acquaintance with their attackers, one can trace the ubiquity of sexual assault to state law conferring on men latitude to force sex on women according to the degree of intimacy men have, or have had, with their victim. See id. at 142 (observing that marital rape exception is most explicit example of state law granting impunity due to relationship between rapist and victim). Furthermore, the routine harassment justice officials subject women to when reporting sexual assault and the pervasive police practice of "unfounding" rape claims make women feel violated by their encounters with the justice system and ultimately discourages reporting all together. See id. at 143 (describing "second rape" phenomenon). Indeed, aware of the fact that the criminal justice system does not prosecute most reported rapes and that most prosecuted rapes do not result in conviction, women do not report most sexual assaults. See id. at 142 (stating that victims reasonably anticipate that authorities will not believe them or will humiliate them). Accordingly, the present body of law has failed to provide equal protection to women and requires a conceptual According to the Bureau ofJustice Statistics, rape is the violent crime least likely to be reported to the police. 172 Eighty-four percent of rape victims do not report having been raped to the police.17-A woman's judgment about the costs and benefits of legal intervention is shaped by her perceptions of likely institutional reactions.
174 Women know what has happened to rape victims in the past and what often continues to happen today: embarrassing questions by the police and prosecutors in private and by defense attorneys in public about a victim's sexual history, the implicit argument that the woman assumed the risk of sexual violence by looking or acting "provocatively" and the focus on the woman's failure to employ sufficient resistance against the man she now claims attacked her. 175 Studies provide support for the notion that this "prejudicial handling by the criminal justice system has increased nonreporting."
176 The decision to report a sexual assault is influenced by prevalent perceptions of police hostility toward sexual assault victims.
17 7 Indeed, victims know that reporting will result in secondary victimization from negative treatment by 169, 185 (1985) . Independent of a host of other accuracy problems with self-reported surveys, one should be cautioned from relying on the results of previous surveys about why crime victims chose not to report their victimization to the police because they did not focus specifically on the extent to which a woman's perception that the criminaljustice system will not take her claim seriously is the reason she does not report. The results of some surveys, nevertheless, are suggestive. One study found that sixty percent of rape victims did not report having been raped to the police because of their low expectations regarding the police response. See generally QUEEN'S BENCH FOUND., RAPE-PREVENTION AND RESISTANCE (1976) (identifying reasons for unreported rapes). Another study found that thirteen percent of rape victims did not report having been raped to the police because the police are inefficient, ineffective or biased. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME VICTIMS 33 (1993). Another study found four percent had no faith that the police could do anything about the matter, twenty-eight percent say it was a private matter. Eleven percent said they had no faith the police would do anything about the matter. Seventeen percent were afraid of reprisals from the offender, believing that the police could not effectively protect them. And forty percent are other. police who harp on irrelevant details and confront victims with disbelief and distrust.
178 Unlike other crime victims, rape victims tend to anticipate how they will be treated and the likely outcome of the case before they decide whether to report the crime to the police. 17 9 As a result, rape victims "tend to only report 'dead bang' cases. That is, they tend to report to the police only when the probability of conviction is high. And, of course, they tend not to report when it is low." 8 0 Christy Brzonkala knew she did not have a "dead bang case." She was raped by two acquaintances who were football players. She did not report the rapes to the police. If one examines the reasons she offered for not reporting, one can see the way the biased common law rape requirements were operational, even in her own mind. According to Brzonkala's complaint, she believed that "criminal prosecution was impossible because she had not preserved any physical evidence of the rape."' 81 Her analysis mirrors the common law requirements of prompt complaint and corroboration that no longer formally apply but continue to direct the discretionary decisions of police and prosecutors. In all likelihood, Brzonkala anticipated correctly that Virginia police and prosecutors would not have pursued her case because she was an acquaintance rape victim who had no physical evidence to corroborate her story. She had waited too long to report. These legal rules-corroboration and prompt complaint-also influenced the state grand jury that, two years later, refused to indict Morrison and Crawford on rape charges.
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Despite decades of legal reform of the formal law of rape, there has not been a substantial change in the proportion of victims who are willing to report having been raped to the police. 183 From the 1970s to the 1990s, there was only a "slight (approximately 10%) increase in the pro-178. See id. at 282. The study also demonstrated that a persuasive communication campaign could stimulate victim reporting by increasing the perceived probability of positive outcomes and in strengthening the perceived normative expectations to report. See id. at 292. To that end, the study showed a video of police officers in initial meetings with victims, treating the victims in a positive manner, not questioning the integrity of the victims, responding to attendant fears and helplessness of victims with empathy and providing clear procedural information to victims. See id. at 286. The information resulted in a statistically significant positive shift in attitude toward reporting and thereby suggested that underreporting results from negative perceptions and expectations associated with police treatment of victims. See id. better overall education and recent penal reforms, negative social attitudes about sexual crime victims-i.e., that "she asked for it"-continue. Wise, supra note 78, at 27. portion of women who reported being the victim of a rape." ' 8 4 Of all the variables that influence the victim's decision to report having been raped to police, the relationship between the offender and the victim appears to be the most important.1 8 5 Women are less likely to report acquaintance rape situations, and eighty percent of rape victims are acquaintance rape victims. 186 The historical police response to rape victims, particularly acquaintance rape victims, has created powerful psychological barriers to rape reporting, such that, even as external social factors change, women continue to experience anxiety, embarrassment and self-blame as a result of sexual victimization. 1 8 7
Three related facts, then, are key: 1) historical and continued unequal state action regarding gender violence; 2) women's justifiable pessimism about states' willingness to respond equally to the violence they suffer; and 3) women's consequent reluctance to report gender violence to state actors. In response to the chronic denial of their equal protection rights, women have little to no faith in states to afford them a remedy. The reality of state action, then, extends further than how state actors respond to those (relatively few) women who do report having been raped. States deter women from turning to their authority because the protection they offer is unequal. This is the scope of the section 1 violation: the vast majority of women have no legal state remedy for suffering rape. They have little hope of legal vindication against their assailants in their state criminal justice systems. They have no way to force states to pursue their legal vindication. ; see also BACHiMAN, supra note 176, at 81 (recognizing need for women to report sexual victimization to increase deterrent effect on would-be rapists). Bachman states: Because the majority of rape victims from this sample did not.., report their victimization to the police, aggressive attempts should be made to make both the reporting and adjudication process of rape less threatening to victims .... More generally, educational efforts should continue to be directed at aligning societal perceptions regarding rape with contemporary legal statutes that more equitably treat rape like other forms of violent crime. In doing this, the historical stigma attached to being a rape victim may further abate, and public attitudes concerning rape might one day catch up to legal norms. With these efforts made, perhaps the reluctance of victims to report and prosecute cases of rape will continue to be reduced. Under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to authorize women to sue their assailants in federal court. Because the criminal justice system deters women from reporting the violence they suffer to state actors, a remedy against these non-state actors is most appropriate.
IV. MORWSO'S SECTION 5 ANALYSIS
In Morrison, the United States Supreme Court concluded that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact § 13981 of VAWA under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Morrison Court's analysis of section 5 is no model of judicial clarity. It is fair to say, however, that the Court concluded that Congress exceeded its authority under section 5 for three reasons. First, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action, not private conduct, and violence against women is private conduct. 
A. State Action
The Court began its analysis of the section 5 issue by identifying the "first and foremost" limit on congressional power under section 5-the "time-honored principle" that the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes only state action.' 92 The Court reaffirmed that the Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong- 198. See id. at 18 ("This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the states alone were or could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong which was intended to be remedied. And the remedy to be provided must necessarily be predicated upon that wrong. It must assume that in the cases provided for, the evil or wrong actually committed rests upon some State law or State authority for its excuse and perpetration."). For remedial legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to be congruent and proportional, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it must "be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to provide against." 20 8 The Court clarified that the "appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.
'2°9 In terms of violence against women, the "mischief and wrong" that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to provide against is the unequal protection states afford women against rape and battery. 210 Here, the "evil presented" is the pervasive lack of legal remedy women have for the gender-motivated violence they suffer. Women believe, with good reason, that the state will not provide them with equal protection and so do not report having been assaulted to the police. The remedy, then, has to be adapted to that mischief.
The Court in Morrison indicated that the most appropriate remedy would be for rape victims to sue those state actors who deny them equal protection.
2 I Limiting relief to suits against state actors would be underinclusive, as well as incongruent and disproportionate to the evil presented, because it would provide potential relief only to those sixteen percent of rape victims who report having been raped to the police and who are denied equal protection. A congruent and proportional remedy to the evil presented would provide potential relief to the vast majority of rape victims, those eighty-four percent of rape victims who do not report having been raped to the police. These victims are deterred from reporting because of state action.
The most congruent and proportional remedy, then, is to afford women the opportunity to pursue legal relief against their abusers in federal court. Giving victims the ability to sue in federal court is adapted to the evil presented that women have no legal remedy at the state level. As SenatorJoseph Biden, author of VAWA, argued, "Section 13981 is calibrated precisely to address the very constitutional violation that Congress identified-the states' failure to afford victims of gender-based violence an opportunity to vindicate their rights on par with other victims of serious violent crime."
'' 2 Here, a remedy against private actors is particularly appropriate when chronic bad action on the part of the state deters women from engaging the state, despite suffering gender-motivated violent crime.
The Morrison Court, however, declared that § 13981 of VAWA was not congruent and proportional because it "visits no consequence whatever on any Virginia public official involved in investigating or prosecuting Brzonkala's assault. Because most women do not report having been raped by state actors, they have no state actor to sue under § 1983. Individual claims against state actors would only provide potential relief for those women who fall within the exception, not the rule. Even for the exceptional victim who does report, it is difficult to bring claims against individual state actors who function with broad discretion. Ostensibly neutral discretionary decisions by police and prosecutors hide intent-bias against women that is grounded in the historical common law of rape. As Senator Biden argued, "an individualized showing of state constitutional violations in each and every case would have imposed an undue-and likely impossible-burden of proof on the very victims whose access to the legal system Congress intended to ease, not restrict." 216 Finally, even if suits against state actors were congruent and proportional, suits against private actors also still would be congruent and proportional to the section 1 violation.
2 17 Under the text of section 5, Congress has the authority to implement all "appropriate" remedial legislation.
C. National Problem
Independent of the state action and the congruence and proportionality doctrines, the United States Supreme Court also ruled in Morrison that § 13981 was unconstitutional remedial legislation because § 13981 applied uniformly across the nation, despite the fact that, as the Court put it, There are federalism concerns raised by § 13981 of VAWA. 224 In the United States, the authority of the federal government is one of enumerated powers and is limited to the powers specifically granted to it by the United States Constitution. The state governments, however, hold a more general police power to protect the health, safety and general welfare of state residents. A state action is invalid only if it violates a limitation imposed by the Constitution. Issues of federalism arise when either a state government or the national government acts outside its respective sphere of power.
Federalism-based limits on the national government protect jurisdictional values and sovereignty values.
2 25 The jurisdictional values, addressing the division of lawmaking authority between the federal and state governments, protect the states from federal intrusion into areas of states' "proper sphere of exclusive regulatoryjurisdiction." 22 6 Sovereignty values, concerning relations between the federal government and states, protect "the states' status and dignity as a co-equal and original sovereign.
'227 Section 13981 of VAWA violates neither the jurisdictional nor the sovereignty principles of federalism. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 136 (criticizing Morrison Court's "specific notion of federalism"). MacKinnon observes that deference to federalism is especially odious in regard to equality rights because women did not contribute to the configuration of federalism's hierarchy with the inviolable "private" being a subprovince of the "local." See id. at 169 (observing that federalism's distrust of centralized power was arranged before women had political voice). Federalism speaks in the voice of men who trust their own power but not the power of other men over them. See id. (referring to Fourth Circuit's preamble finding VAWA unconstitutional). The experience of women, and other subordinated groups, is not to distrust centralized power but to distrust the system of limited and dispersed power that has preserved their inequality. See id. (analogizing to experience of African Americans whose slavery was maintained by "states' rights").
225. See Caminker, supra note 217, at 1364-65 (discussing structural principles of federalism). Federalism also protects the "effectiveness of both state and federal governments as representative bodies .. " Brzonkala v. Va. Polytech Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 927 (4th Cir. 1999) (MotzJ., dissenting) (arguing that political accountability of elected officials "suffers when citizens are confused about which sphere of government is responsible for the regulation of an activity") (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) 233. See Caminker, supra note 217, at 1366 (arguing that evaluation of congressional interference with state police power should not turn on whether remediation scheme is aimed at public or private actors). Caminker states:
[T]he potential preemptive scope of private remediation is no greater than the potential preemptive scope of conventional public remediation. It is true that congressional regulation of private conduct can, and often does, trump state law and thereby displace the state's erstwhile regulatory role. But congressional regulation of state conduct does much the same thing. Id.; see also id. at 1367-68 (hypothesizing that states would be forced to alter enforcement of their laws to achieve equal protection for men and women). most women turn when they are sexually violated, primarily because women do not want to be hurt even more. They do not want to face the disbelief, accusations of guilt and disregard they have come to expect from state actors. The vast majority of women do not report to police the sexual violence they suffer. Even when women do not report, however, states have acted to deny those women equal protection because of what happened before. This insight is what a re-evaluation of the interaction between the state and victims of sexual violence reveals.
Allowing those relatively few women who do report to sue state actors will not help those women, much greater in number, whose rights are also violated by bad state actions who choose not to report. Such a narrow solution, suggested by the Court in Morrison, will not address the broader reality of women's lack of a legal remedy for the sexual violence they suffer. Only allowing women to make claims in federal court against private actors who commit gender-motivated violence would provide women with a remedy that is congruent and proportional to the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment that women suffer.
Critics might argue that I am proposing an end-run around the normal rules applicable to section 5 legislation. Sexual violence, however, is a context in which citizens interact with legal actors in a way that is particularly sensitive to the prospect of futile engagement with the state. When viewed in this light, the normal rules of what Congress can reach must be re-evaluated, and narrow prescriptions that are no better than the status quo will not suffice.
